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ABSTRACT

A MODEL OF INSURGENCY: REFLECTIONS OF CLAUSEWITZ'S "PARADOXICAL TRINITY." Lessons for Operational Planners Considering Conventional Forces in Unconventional Operations. By Major John C. Buckley, II, USA 40 pages.

This monograph addresses the employment of conventional military force against insurgency. First, it provides a model to analyze insurgency in terms of Clausewitz's "paradoxical trinity." Secondly, the monograph assesses this model's validity by applying it to the Vietnam War and the conflict in Northern Ireland. The paper concludes with implications for future planners considering conventional forces in unconventional operations.

Although the two world powers failed to direct military operations properly in their respective insurgent environments, this study provides some unique operational planning considerations. These considerations are important since the end of the Cold War has simultaneously caused a reduction in U.S. military forces, and compelled the U.S. to increase its global commitments in a hostile strategic environment.

A MODEL OF INSURGENCY:
REFLECTIONS OF CLAUSEWITZ'S
"PARADOXICAL TRINITY"
Lessons For Operational Planners
Considering Conventional Forces
in Unconventional Operations

A Monograph
By
Major John C. Buckley, II
Infantry

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I. INTRODUCTION

History shows that it is a great challenge to prepare conventional forces to operate successfully in an unconventional campaign. Leaders and soldiers must adapt to different cultures and values, unfamiliar and discomforting levels of poverty, uncertainty of purpose and problems in identifying the enemy.[1] Simultaneously, the nature of the conflict imposes constraints on conventional military methods while exposing soldiers to an unconstrained adversary.[2]

The United States has a long history of employing its conventional forces in unconventional operations, beginning with its own Revolution. Examples include the Philippines, the Banana Wars of 1915-1934 and the Greek Civil War. America's military has accumulated an impressive record of success despite the inherent difficulties of operating in unconventional situations. Today's uncertain world, however, complicates this military challenge.

The Cold War has caused sweeping changes in the world's political, economic, and social environments. The recent demise of the Soviet Union has made the worldwide situation ambiguous. The threats to vital US interests are obscure. However, US national interests require the military to remain engaged in an uncertain world that is in transition.[3] Therefore, the Army must remain a viable means to influence the international environment according to the nation's needs.[4]

The existing situation has also produced a reduction in military strength. This reduction and the diverse, uncertain national threats require a subsequent restructuring of forces.

Currently, architects are designing a much more agile and complex power projection force able to secure the nation's interests. Given the global breadth of current national strategy, it is highly probable the US will use conventional forces to prosecute counterinsurgency operations. This capability is essential to counter the broad, unpredictable range of threats to the U.S. national security.[5]

This monograph examines the use of conventional military forces against insurgencies and provides unique operational planning considerations. The monograph presents a model of insurgency in terms of Clausewitz's trinity. Then it assesses its validity by applying the model to two contemporary insurgencies of completely different natures. The first insurgency considered is the US Army in Vietnam from 1957-1968. The second insurgency is the British Army in Northern Ireland from 1969-1984. Discussion centers on insurgency conditions and objectives and methods. Finally, this monograph will determine the model's utility for operational planners regarding unconventional operations.

Where Does Insurgency Fit?

Despite its location on the conflict spectrum, the instrument for the resolution of a conflict must be appropriate to its nature.[6] The instruments available to the US come from a mixture of political, economical, informational, and military sources. In some Operations Other than War (OOTW), the role of military force is often indirect. Accordingly, military operations must complement and support non-military programs.[7]

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According to <u>Field Manual 100-5, Operations</u>, military operations against insurgent forces fall within the realm of OOTW. Political, economic, and psychological objectives shape the execution of these operations. The military's ability to understand the political objectives, and the tactics and objectives of insurgents is essential to success. More important, commanders need to understand the nature of the conflict in which they are about to enter, and the role that their force assumes.

II. THE NATURE OF CONFLICT

Nature of War

     Much of Clausewitz's military theory is still applicable to US strategy today. His model of war focuses on the influences that a sovereign state must consider when it contemplates war. This model, or "paradoxical trinity," contains three "dominant tendencies" which are ever-present in war. The first is "primordial violence, hatred and enmity." The second tendency is the play of "chance and probability." The last tendency is that of "reason alone." This is the "element of subordination" and "instrument of policy" which provides the purpose of war. In order, these three tendencies pertain to the people, the military and the government. (Fig. 1) According to Clausewitz, nations must balance these influences to be effective in war.[8]

     Clausewitz's contention, written during the Napoleonic era, reflects the society of his time, which saw the beginning of the nation state. It is still valid in the US because the relationship between society, the military and the government have virtually remained the same. Second, this model addresses the nature of interstate war. From his experiences, Clausewitz determined that this type of war requires the entire energy of

Clausewitz's "Paradoxical Trinity"

Figure 1

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the state. The US developed a style of interstate warfare that fits into Clausewitz's trinity. A variation of this model, however, can apply to the nature of intrastate conflict.

Nature of Insurgency

Insurgency is a form of conflict that denotes the use of organized violence to effect change within a state.[9] It is an armed political struggle in pursuit of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government. The insurgent attempts to obtain political goals with an organized and primarily indigenous group or groups using protracted, irregular warfare and coordinated political techniques.[10]

Insurgent forces often organize along political lines to support political, economic, social, military, psychological, and covert operations. Their military formations normally use guerilla warfare tactics.[11] The characteristics of this style of warfare include offensive action at the time and place of the guerilla's choosing. This happens when the guerilla can develop local superiority, relying on evasion rather than defensive combat for protection. Along with overt actions, insurgency can include strikes, demonstrations, propaganda, political organization, and diplomacy.[12]

Typically, the government will possess superior military capabilities over the insurgents. To overcome their conventional military deficiencies, insurgents first identify, then attack the government's salient weaknesses. Most likely, insurgent military formations avoid conventional confrontations. Often, they

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inflict damage upon persons or property not directly linked with an insurgent situation. With these methods, they intend to persuade the population that the government's weaknesses severely threaten the nation's survival.[13]

A conflict of this nature reflects Clausewitz's "paradoxical trinity" - it is triangular. However, the insurgent and government, and their respective armed forces do not just contend with each other. They also struggle with each other indirectly to organize and manipulate the society to achieve their respective aims. They compete for the support and control of the same civilian population.[14]

A variation of Clausewitz's "paradoxical trinity" captures this relationship. Insurgency creates a mirrored image of Clausewitz's model with the people joined at the surface of the mirror. (Fig. 2) Replicating the standing government is the hard core insurgent political body that provides direction to the cause. Opposite Clausewitz's military lies the guerilla source that the insurgent uses to build a successful strategic foundation. These guerrillas employ both political and military techniques to organize and gather support from the people, the third leg of the triangle. Viewing insurgency in this

Insurgent   **Government**

Guerrillas   **People**   **Military**

Model for Insurgency

Figure 2

Clausewitzian framework, military operations to support or counter insurgency remains subordinate to political direction.

Operational Design

It follows that the operational planner needs to understand political objectives of those involved in the struggle. Furthermore, he needs to comprehend the means available and ways or methods for their use and integration. A useful analogy for understanding this is to consider insurgency as a revolution with a head, but no body. The insurgent "head" will recruit civilians to form the "body." He employs his military and political means to compel the population to support his cause. The government's counterinsurgency objective is to prevent a connection of the "head" and the "body," effectively stopping the revolution.

Insurgency Goals

The insurgent's goal is to replace the established government.[15] Through economic and social means, he attempts to establish the insurgent political structure as the legitimate government. Secondly, he uses political and military means to discredit the government. He does this by first sowing seeds of doubt about the government's capacity to govern and to defend its citizens. Then, and more overtly, he exposes these weaknesses. This causes a steady erosion of civil liberties to a point where commitments to national values weaken.[16] The insurgent often uses informational tools to distribute propaganda that support his cause or oppose the government's. His purpose is to create disorder in society, setting favorable conditions for insurgency.

Ways in which the insurgent "head" applies these means vary according to the situation and the environment. Typically, an insurgent will attempt to foment discontent within society. He will expose the government and its military as incompetent and an enemy of the people. Additionally, he will exploit any misuse of the government's strength in an attempt to portray the government as oppressive. Since the insurgent's organization is typically weak militarily, he gains and maintains strength with the civilian population psychologically by indirect, political means.

For insurgency to be successful, a primary support system anchored on the population is paramount.[17] Therefore, the insurgent's primary intention is to encourage the "body" to join the insurgent "head" in its movement. This "body" becomes the foundation upon which the insurgent builds his strength.[18] If the insurgent is victorious in this battle over control of the "body," he can manipulate the rest of the environment to his advantage and achieve his objective.

Counterinsurgency Goals

Field Manual 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict says that the counterinsurgent's goal is to defeat or suppress the insurgent movement.[19] Through local police forces, militias, and the media, the government must isolate the insurgent from the people. To achieve this objective, the government must do three things. First it must pacify society while strengthening its own legitimacy. Second it must protect and secure the populace from the insurgent's violence programs. Third, at some point the government must conduct military actions to destroy the

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insurgent's guerilla or conventional military forces. Together, these three activities comprise a coordinated blend of available instruments of national power.[20]

Successful internal development reduces the causes of dissatisfaction that produced the insurgency. This alone can nearly stop the Revolution. Therefore, military force must complement these social programs. When using conventional force to complement internal development, the government must remember its ultimate purpose is to improve its service to society and build legitimacy. The government's task is to determine the most beneficial integration of social and military means to prevent a connection of the insurgent "head" with a "body."

Combat forces should apply only the minimum required force to accomplish the mission. The unlimited use of conventional military power may irritate civilians and cause them to embrace the insurgent cause. However, developing tactics and techniques that strike at the insurgent without irritating the population is very difficult. Therefore, military operations must be unpredictable, and disorienting to the insurgent.

No insurgency follows one pattern exclusively. Each develops unique characteristics appropriate to its own circumstances. The one common component that is found in each insurgency, however, is the importance of the population. The ultimate final victory in insurgency rests with the organization that best satisfies the population. This is where the model of insurgency departs from that of Clausewitz's "paradoxical trinity."

Clausewitz's model achieves its end solely through combat.[21]

Whichever army destroys the opposing army achieves victory. In the insurgency model, victory comes more subtly. Whichever organization develops operations that enhance society the most stands a greater chance of winning the struggle.

The following chapter is an analysis of insurgencies in Vietnam and Northern Ireland. The analysis will look at the ways that the adversaries employ means trying to achieve their objectives. It will identify how each method may have supported or detracted from achieving victory. More specifically, it will focus on the struggle over control of the population, or the "body."

III. CONTEMPORARY INSURGENCIES

Vietnam

The Vietnam War lasted from 1946 to 1975. It begins with the advisory period in 1957 and concludes with the intervention of overwhelming US conventional military force in 1968. In these eleven years, South Vietnam and its US allies combated an insurgency sponsored by the communist north. The North Vietnamese "head" directed the political and military actions of the Communist guerilla force, the Vietcong. The communist aim in conducting this insurgency was threefold.[22] The ultimate aim was to unify the nation under its own rule. Second, the political intent was to preserve the legal status of the southern masses while undermining the Saigon government. Third, it was necessary to accumulate forces and develop apparatus to sustain the action. The counterinsurgent's aim was also threefold.[23] The primary goal was to prevent Communism from engulfing all of Asia. The second goal was to prevent a Communist takeover of South Vietnam. The third aim was to improve morale of South Vietnam's military forces.[24] This section focuses on the period from 1957 to 1968 in which US forces were directly involved.

Background: There were strong patriotic sentiments in Vietnam developed before and during World War II. A coalition of Vietnamese nationalist groups, dominated by communist leaders, declared Vietnam independent in 1945. Subsequent events saw this Vietnamese organization – Viet Minh – trying to solidify a Communist regime and defend its position against the French and some of their Vietnamese supporters.[25] After World War II, the

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French attempted to reestablish their sovereignty. As a result they became involved in a prolonged struggle with the Viet Minh, who were trying to defend their newly proclaimed independence. The Viet Minh defeated the French forces in 1954 through propaganda, planned uprisings, guerilla warfare and other unconventional warfare techniques. The French defeat at Dienbienphu, in May 1954 symbolized France's untenable position in Vietnam.

In July 1954, nine nations, including the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China, took part in peace settlement discussions in Geneva Switzerland. As part of the agreements, North and South Vietnam were recognized as two separate zones divided at the 17th parallel. The Communist Party would not accept the prospect of a permanent partition of Vietnam so they prepared for a protracted struggle.[26]

In the north, Ho Chi Minh strengthened his regime. He eliminated his non-Communist associates and created a tightly controlled Communist government. Meanwhile, the newly elected President in the South, Ngo Denh Diem barely managed to hold the fragmented south together. He had many political obstacles and a dissatisfied population with which to contend.

The people of South Vietnam were not happy with their fledgling government. Land reform programs favored the rich and disturbed traditional land boundaries. The government was corrupt and decided to forego industrialization. This did not work to the advantage of the Vietnamese. It made their French installed economy restrictive, and made their market overpriced.[27] Furthermore, the government exercised prejudicial

treatment against minorities.[28] It did not give minority
communities autonomy, it shuffled their boundaries, and it denied
minorities the use of their native language, religion and
cultural customs.[29]

Saigon pacification efforts languished. South Vietnamese
programs failed to provide security for the villagers and
effective police action to route out the Vietcong cadre. These
deficiencies further complicated the government's political,
social and economic situations. The result was a population that
perceived its government as incompetent.[30] The Vietcong quickly
took advantage of this discontentment.

In the late 1950s, the North Vietnamese communist leadership
infiltrated guerilla forces into southern villages. They joined
with guerrillas who had remained underground in the South after
the French departed. Together, these Vietcong forces began their
own social and economic reforms. They initiated trade union
rights, ethnic minority group rights and freedom from religious
discrimination.[31] By 1957, guerrillas began harassing village
officials and government social programs.[32] It was an attempt to
gain the support of the people by discrediting the South Vietnam
government.

The Saigon government's methods for pacifying the population
were disasters. Moreover, the government could not protect its
citizens from the Vietcong. Therefore, the population
increasingly supported the insurgent cause. The successes of
these guerrillas and the inability to govern effectively
encouraged Diem to ask for increased aid from the US. The US
justified this request primarily to stop the spread of

Communism.[33]

Strategy of the North: Since the Geneva convention of 1954, the
strategy in the North became one of unifying the country. They
made efforts through offensive guerilla actions in the south,
combined with a conventional military force in the north, the
People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). The mission of the guerrillas
was to liberate the south to allow unification. The mission of
the PAVN was to cause the unification.[34]

The communists broke down their protracted strategy into
three stages. The first stage was strictly a guerilla operation
intended to build the foundation for insurgency. This stage was
not to be decisive, but was vital to the creation of the
revolutionary "body." The second stage was a war of movement
where the conflict resembled a conventional small-scale war. The
communists would combine guerilla action with mobile warfare
causing heavy attrition to the enemy. The third stage was pure
military action intended to complete the overthrow of the Saigon
government.

The military actions, or <u>armed dau tranh</u>, were revolutionary
violence programs. The political actions, or <u>political dau
tranh</u>, consisted of a systematic coercive activity that involved
motivation, social organization, common ideas and mobilization of
manpower and support.[35] These actions were considered "the jaws
of the pincers used to attack the enemy."[36] The Communist
leadership had to balance these actions because neither could be
successful alone. In the first two stages, the primary emphasis
was on political power. This was necessary because the

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guerrillas could not sustain the war without a "body." Military power was a secondary effort and at times took precedence depending on the situation.

During the first stage, the Communist guerrillas directed both actions to gain popular support for their cause. Vietcong political cadres working from previously held areas began expanding into new territories. The new regions increased resources in manpower, intelligence and logistics to the main force.[37] Then the Vietcong co-opted the people to support the military actions indirectly. This helped the insurgents accumulate equipment, arms, and ammunition for their cause. The people also provided the communist a pool from which to recruit soldiers, and informants for human intelligence about the government's efforts. Ultimately, when the Vietcong gained the "body's" support, they used it to make up for its military weaknesses.[38]

In the second stage, Communist forces fought to maintain access to the population. Their tactics included raids and ambushes on fixed sites. They remained selective about combat actions with conventional forces.[39] The "head," receiving improved intelligence flow from its "body," easily evaded and ambushed government forces at will.[40] The Vietcong were very elusive. For example, one effective technique was to "dig in" outside a village and provoke the US to attack. Ultimately, the US leveled the village and the Vietcong survived. The result was more refugees or a village converted to the communist cause.[41]

Strategy of South Vietnam and the US: Initially, the US

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perspective on the guerilla movement in South Vietnam was that the North controlled it. The US speculated that the guerrillas were a partisan auxiliary to the large, well-organized People's Army of North Vietnam (PAVN). This position assumed that the conflict would be a conventional war with a mix of guerilla operations. Therefore, the US advised the ARVN to prepare exclusively for a PAVN invasion of South Vietnam.[42] The US based operational planning on the same assumption. Consequently, the US developed and executed a strategy of predominately conventional warfighting methods to counter the PAVN.

Following the advice of the US, Diem attempted to pacify the South Vietnamese population and defeat the aggressive guerrillas simultaneously.[43] From the outset, Diem's cheap pacification programs focused on the security of the population, but did not consider societies' true needs. The government did not provide schools, medical care, or other tangible social services.[44] Diem's subordinates exacerbated the land issue when they uprooted peasants from native villages and disrupted traditional social patterns.

Secondly, trying to diminish the Vietcong's organization, the conventionally trained and US advised ARVN produced negative side effects on the civilian population. This drive consisted of indiscriminate village searches and bombing that incited distrust of the government within the peasant community. The conventional military forces angered the citizens and caused many retired Viet Minh to return underground to fight against Diem and the US.[45]

Following the assassinations of Diem and President Kennedy, the US strategy changed to incorporate limited conventional

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force. In 1965, President Johnson directed a military intervention to coerce the North Vietnamese communists to the negotiating table through a graduated response. US military leaders attempted, through force and the show of force, to compel the guerrillas to retire and the North Vietnamese Army not to intervene. This program began with the bombing of infiltration routes. It included air strikes against rail and road lines leading into China, internal lines of communication and targets such as dams, bridges and ferries. These conventional actions were successful against conventional forces and guerrillas; but, they upset the population even more. Hence, the peasant "body" rallied behind the Communist "head" in defiance of the incumbent methods.

The restricted military effort gave way to a more conventional strategy one year later. Since the Vietcong's presence remained in the south, the US military requested, and received authority for the intervention of ground forces. The new US strategy of attrition emphasized speed and action.[46] This was to take advantage of the US Army doctrine of mobile warfare supported with massive fire power. The operational design emphasized increased firepower and mobility, search and destroy operations and bombing North Vietnam into capitulation.[47] The unobserved fire employed in the execution caught neutral or potentially friendly civilians in the middle. As a result, these civilians converted into either southern refugees or insurgent activists.[48]

Later, the U.S. expanded conventional efforts even more. These included border control with Cambodia and Laos, "hot

pursuit" into Cambodia and Laotian territory, and retaliatory strikes against the infrastructure in the north.[49] These activities overlooked the close-in security needed for pacification, and exposed the population to the guerrillas. The result was that the US neither secured the population nor drew the elusive guerrillas into a decisive battle.[50] The Army ignored the basic requirements of counterinsurgency; a secure population committed to an effective government. While the Army killed many Vietcong, it never denied the insurgent "head" access to his much needed "body."[51]

Assessment: The conflict in Vietnam during this period fits the proposed model for insurgency. Through political and military efforts, the Communists could discredit the South's government and establish its own legitimacy with the population. The South, even with US assistance failed to maintain its legitimacy and did not prevent the connection of the insurgent "head" and the "body." Furthermore, by employing massive military programs, they inspired greater support for insurgency.

In this conflict, the most important element was the peasant population.[52] The South Vietnamese and US misdirected their efforts against the enemy's main forces. Their inability to grasp the nature of this conflict brought them defeat. On the other hand, the North Vietnamese correctly analyzed the nature of the struggle in which they were engaging. They used their experience against the French, and organized coherently to defeat South Vietnam and its allies by focusing efforts on the South Vietnamese society.

The guerrillas controlled the population. They encouraged the population to support the insurgent's Revolution through propaganda, threats, and security. By initiating social and economic reforms, they effectively undertook the government functions of maintaining control. Integrating political and armed <u>dau tranh</u> quickly expanded the "body." The communists solidified this connection through persuasion and infiltration into villages. The "body" became another asset available for the "head" of the insurgency to employ against the South Vietnamese government.[53] Furthermore, their coordinated political, economic, military and informational programs organized the "body" to make up for their conventional inferiority.

On the other hand, the US military disregarded the effect of guerilla warfare on the struggle for popular support. They did not direct any effective programs toward improving village life, nor sufficiently address control of the population. Ultimately, by indiscriminately employing conventional methods, and by overlooking the true dissatisfaction of the populace, the US military efforts encouraged the conversion of the peasant "body" to that of Vietcong sympathizers.

Northern Ireland

The roots of the conflict in Northern Ireland predate modern history, but still survive today. This insurgency is unique since Great Britain is neither an indigenous ruling elite nor a colonial power. The Irish Catholics, however, view the British as an invading, occupying army, and a colonial power.[54] The Northern Ireland conflict is also unusual in that there are two

groups - the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Ulster Defense Force (UDA) - whose behavior gives them the appearance of being separate, competing insurgents.[55] Both launch attacks against the British and each other for diametrically opposed objectives.

This section begins with the introduction of the British Army in 1969. It concludes with the reestablishment of local authorities in 1976. The section will concentrate on the confrontation between the British Army and the PIRA over control of the Catholic population in Ireland. During this period, the PIRA's aim was to unite Ireland and remove British presence from the region.[56] On the other hand, the aim of the British Army was to enforce the peace in Northern Ireland.[57]

Background: The struggle over the control of Ireland began with an invasion by English mercenaries in 1169, and it continues today. Early in the 17th century, the English Army confiscated abandoned Irish property in Ulster and offered it to English and Scottish colonists. The conflict then expanded between the Irish and colonists over differences relating to language, custom, art, and most importantly religion. The result has been a struggle for power and property that has manifested itself as a religious war.[58]

This struggle has included the entire Irish population; however, the center of modern fighting is in the six northern counties of the Ulster region, called Northern Ireland. In 1920 English politicians divided Ireland into thirty-two counties. This was to provide Home Rule for both majority populations,

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Catholics and Protestants. The Catholic population dominates the southern twenty-six counties of Ireland, or the Free State Republic. The Protestants are a majority in Northern Ireland with a minority of Irish Catholics remaining in pockets throughout these six counties.

In 1850, Catholic militants founded a secret society called the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). They expected to improve conditions in Ireland through small-scale political violence. In the early part of the twentieth century, the IRA expanded the campaign with attacks along the border between the Republic and Northern Ireland, focusing on British Army installations. Their intent was to end the partition and create a united Irish Republic. This campaign failed in 1956 and caused the IRA to collapse in 1963.

Following this collapse, a "new" and less violent IRA emerged. This group focused on the growing civil rights movement within the Catholic community. They adopted the nonviolent approach from the civil rights movement in the US. Their protests and marches focused on economic and social grievances - housing and employment - with the intent of breaking down Protestant domination of the social structure. This effort grew in Catholic public support and the IRA movement regained momentum.

The Catholics in Ulster wanted to be equal participants in economic, political and social systems of the North. Ideas of unification with the Republic were of minor concern. Their issue was one of civil rights. Northern Catholics perceived their government to be oppressive. They were unhappy with the feudal

class distinction, severe unemployment, a failing economy, and an increasingly unstable political arrangement.[59]

The civil rights movement called for reforms in housing and education, states investment in industry to provide jobs, and allocation of land from vast private estates to agricultural cooperatives.[60] The people also demanded proper representation in government and repeal of repressive legislation. The Irish government attempted to respond to these needs and to crack down simultaneously on the violence between the separate factions. Their efforts were successful and in 1963 they caused the collapse of the IRA, destroying much of the overt pro-IRA support.[61] It all ceased in August 1969 when civil authorities lost control of a riotous situation in Londonderry.

In 1969, to punctuate the continued dissatisfaction and put life into the civil rights campaign, Northern Catholics organized a peaceful march. Protestants and the police hindered and harried the marchers over the entire root. This peaceful demonstration collided with another supported by the Protestants and violence erupted.[62] This led to rioting and property destruction. The Irish authorities were incapable of extinguishing these riots and asked the British for help. The British Government thus introduced its Army into the "front lines" of this conflict, replacing the police. The Army's objective was to control the rioting in Northern Ireland and establish the peace.

The rioting and the resultant introduction of British troops caused another split of the IRA. From this split developed the Provisional IRA (PIRA), organized from "old guard" IRA members

present in the violent 1950s campaigns. This organization
believed in the resurgence of violence and initiated an
insurgency against the British authorities.[63] Thus, the
situation in which the British soldiers found themselves was one
they did not expect. Unknowingly, they entered a struggle with
the PIRA over control of the Catholic population.

PIRA Strategy: The Catholic movement, led by the PIRA, took the
opportunity to undertake an insurgency supported by a terrorist
campaign. Their strategy contained two elements, displaying
violence and educating the population to their cause. They
directed both at discrediting the British government and
establishing the legitimacy of the PIRA. Their intention was to
undermine British control and consign the British soldiers to the
role of "traditional enemy." Concurrently, the PIRA assumed
defense of the Catholic areas.[64]

Initially, the PIRA harassed the British Army directly and
indirectly while building the PIRA arsenal and treasury. They
intended to show the Catholic population that the British
government could no longer govern.[65] The harassment of the
British Army took the form of terrorist bombing. The design of
this element of the insurgency campaign was twofold.[66] First it
was to cause confusion and terror throughout the Northern Ireland
population. Second, it was to make the British effort very
costly.

The PIRA's political education of the Northern population
wisely used the media to influence the public perceptions of the
conflict. They spread the word that the problems in Ireland

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stemmed from the connection with Britain. A second message was that the connection with Britain could be broken only through physical force. They contended that since the British Army entered Ireland by force and held the Irish people by force, the Irish had to drive them from Ireland by force.[67]

The PIRA often staged events just for publicity. They timed bomb explosions to obtain maximum television coverage and presented "eye" witnesses espousing Irish innocence and British Army condemnation.[68] The bombing and educating influenced several Irish Catholics to support the PIRA efforts. Thus began the formation of the insurgent "body" in Northern Ireland.

To enhance their efforts, and to direct its growing "body" better, the PIRA organized defense committees in the northern counties. These organizations became actively involved in local events. Occasionally, they directly provided security to the community where the British Army could not. Often, they recruited local youths to join in the effort. The effectiveness of this technique incited the population to condemn British actions and lose faith in the British Army. These endeavors often encouraged citizens to put themselves in harms way to protect PIRA soldiers despite the soldier's activity.

Once the PIRA gained some local support, the insurgent "head" organized volunteer soldiers into gangs and employed them in an urban version of covert hit-and-run tactics. Their tactics included brick, iron, petrol bomb, gelignite bomb and stone throwing.[69] They operated under PIRA sniper fire most of the time. These gangs specialized in attacks on security forces, in destruction and arson, in highjacking vehicles and intimidation.

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After striking, they simply melted into the city.[70]

The PIRA's bombing and sabotage campaigns focused on the British Army. Their principal objective was to tie-down as many British troops as possible in the cities and towns. This would prevent British troops from influencing the Catholic population and from impeding the PIRA in the country.[71] They did not direct their efforts at producing casualties. This would have been counterproductive to their cause. Additionally, they gave several warnings about where they placed bombs to prevent civilian casualties.[72]

When British troops invaded rural areas, PIRA soldiers stood by and watched.[73] After giving the British a sense of winning, the guerrillas suddenly hit back fiercely using sniper fire and mortars inflicting severe British casualties. Snipers and mortarmen executed hit-and-run tactics never presenting a target in return.[74] This strategy and constant awareness of injuring or disturbing citizens increased the people's interest in the PIRA cause. Furthermore, by providing security and assistance to several communities in the North, the PIRA could sustain their operations throughout the 1970s and into the 1990s.[75]

British Strategy: Upon receiving the request for military support, the British government decided the situation required direct military aid to the civil power in Northern Ireland.[76] Since the strategic aim was to restore peace, and the rioting mostly occurred in cities, the British military concentrated on key urban areas. They initially set up peace lines to separate Catholic and Protestant factions. The operational objective was

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to move British units to disputed areas to keep the two sides apart physically.[77] Initially because of a small force and the restrictive rules of engagement (ROE), soldiers were incapable of doing anything to suppress riots. However, when rioting continued in several Catholic communities the British took over their defense. Simultaneously, they announced that the PIRA was now their main enemy. These actions and the newly stated intentions confused the Catholic population about the purpose of the British intervention.[78]

By taking over community defense functions, the army was now acting 'for' civil power instead of 'in aid of civil power.' Since they had no experience in this area, the British Army leaders failed in coordinating a civil-military approach to the problem. Military necessity took precedence over social needs. During the large-scale searches for "hooligans," soldiers commandeered schools and community centers and used them as barracks.[79] This made the British Army the oppressor in the eyes of the Catholic population. This important element of the Northern Irish populace began to compare the British actions to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.[80]

The misunderstanding of this situation led to further British mistakes. The British emplaced curfews and internment, and began interrogating citizens in depth.[81] These programs irritated the population immeasurably. Many reports of brutality and forced confessions surfaced, fueling the societies' discontentment more. Furthermore, when the British response to a civil rights peace march in January 1972 turned violent, the resultant uproar reverberated around the world.[82]

The British saw this incident as a success. Others, especially the Catholic population call this event "Bloody Sunday." They saw the Army's actions as reckless, and sheer, unadulterated murder.[83] If it was not clear before, the Catholic population now overtly acted as the insurgent "body," and made itself available for use against the British Army.

The British Army's actions on "Bloody Sunday" merely perpetrated the justice of the PIRA's cause and strengthened their commitment for violent resistance. The British lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the Catholic population. British Army leaders therefore decided to use Irish agencies to solve the problem. The British government agreed to make the local police responsible for local security and for enforcing the law while the British Army provided assistance. The Army reverted to its initially stated role of an army in support of civil power.[84]

The police quickly improved the intelligence collection and the community relations programs. Meanwhile, the British Army no longer saturated the area after an incident, but cordoned it off while the police and detectives went in.[85] By coming off the front lines, the British Army had time to improve several facets of its campaign. First, it improved its counter-propaganda effort. This began to cause dissension in the ranks of the IRA and the Irish population. Second, the British Army improved its intelligence collection by moving into a surveillance and information gathering role. By operating more Observation Points (OP), and vehicle check points, the Army developed a complete, coherent picture of the enemy. These tactics generated an accurate profile and strategy of the PIRA, and more worthwhile

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information on community leaders and members.

From these new efforts, the Army adjusted its training, tactics and strategy. British operations became less one-sided. Whatever happened to the Northern Catholic communities happened as well in the Protestant communities. With this done, the Army felt that the Catholic "body" began to separate from the PIRA "head."

Assessment: The complex environment in Northern Ireland also fits the model of insurgency. The PIRA movement attracted the Catholic population primarily because the guerrillas provided some protection for them. The British, on the other hand, lost its legitimacy when it removed the local police forces, failed to provide security and then harassed the Catholic population which it professed to be protecting. On top of this, they could not defeat the guerrillas because the PIRA merged with the population.

In this struggle, the most important element was the Northern Irish Catholic population. In 1969, this element of the population initially welcomed the arrival of the British troops. They realized that the Irish government could not protect them from Protestant mobs and assumed that these troops would. But when the Catholics called for help and the British Army refused, this honeymoon period ended. The PIRA intervened and demonstrated adequate defense of the area, winning some popular support for their cause.

As people alienated themselves from the British Army, the appeal of the PIRA became more attractive and brought more

recruits to the latter's movement. The population under the direction of the PIRA became a mass movement and openly protected the PIRA. This made the PIRA stronger and more threatening to the British Army.

After failing to enforce the peace, the British Army routinely began to patrol the Catholic working-class areas. They searched people indiscriminately in an attempt to root out the PIRA. Violence continued and the British response was internment.[86] The prosecution of this program, "Bloody Sunday" events, and the rough handling of witnesses and prisoners encouraged the population to support insurgency. Instead of eliminating unrest, these actions spurned it on.[87]

The PIRA initially won the struggle over control of the Catholic populace. Additionally, they successfully employed them against the British army. After realizing that it was losing the war with the PIRA, the British Army changed its operational plan. The new strategy included a sincere concentration on boosting the economy and hitting the terrorist.[88] The police took up its normal role with strong support from the British Army improving the legitimacy of the state.[89] Also, the Army's actions became more selective and accurate. Working together, the police and the British Army enhanced society and prevented unnecessary interference with citizens' lives.

By 1976, the civil-military strategy began to take shape encouraging the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland to support the government.[90] These actions began to sever the connection between the PIRA "head" and its Northern Catholic "body." Although the conflict has not ended, by following this method for

IV. IMPLICATIONS

The complexity of counterinsurgency is not the only reason for failure in both Vietnam and Northern Ireland. The most prevalent problem is that neither conventional army focused its efforts against the decisive element in their respective campaigns, the connection of the insurgent and the population. In fact, the initial operational designs exacerbated the public's discontentment, inadvertently encouraging the populations' support for the insurgent's cause. The American and British armies invited the connection of the "body" to the insurgent "head."

Both conventional armies believed that they could coerce the insurgent to the bargaining table through increased conventional efforts. (Fig. 3) Neither analyzed their opponent appropriately, nor considered the effects that any action would have on the population. They directed their main efforts against the guerrillas, and attempted to isolate the guerilla from its associated main forces. What the armies did not address was how to defeat their adversaries strategy. The insurgents directed their main effort against the decisive

Insurgent   Government

Guerrillas   People   Military

Main Effort   Supporting Effort

U.S. and British Counterinsurgency Strategies

Figure 3

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element. (Fig. 4)

The insurgents in both Vietnam and Northern Ireland won the
struggle for control of
the populace. The
conventional forces
possessed a
technological
advantage, and the
quality of their
forces far
surpassed the
insurgents in
every facet.
Nevertheless, the

**North Vietnamese and PIRA
Strategies**

Figure 4

insurgents very capably connected the "body" to
their political "head." Then, they successfully employed the
"body" against the government and the superior conventional
armies.

The ability of planners to design operations properly to
defeat a given threat proves to be the difference in achieving
victory. The lessons derived from the study of these two
insurgencies can help operational planners in future insurgent
conflicts. First, planners need to analyze the nature of the
particular conflict correctly. Considerations must include the
enemy, the environment, political objectives, and the population.
Second, and closely related to the first lesson, planners must
know the role that military forces assume within the context of
the strategic plan. By doing this, planners can orient forces

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toward appropriate objectives to reinforce the government's legitimacy. A third lesson is that planners must realize military operations alone cannot provide decisive victory in counterinsurgency. Today's doctrine reinforces this. Field Manual 100-5 says that in many OOTW, other national agencies may direct military efforts.[91]

After thorough consideration of these points, planners can design military operations to simultaneously deny guerrilla access to the population and encourage the population to support its government. More important, this will enable operational planners to employ military forces in concert with other elements of national power to achieve a net synergistic effect. Coordinated civil-military actions oriented on preventing the fusion of the "head" and "body" is paramount for success in counterinsurgency.

Know the Nature of the Conflict

Strategic and operational success rests primarily on military progress. Effective military progress requires a correct analysis of the nature of the particular conflict. Because leaders did not appreciate the nature of the conflicts in Vietnam and Northern Ireland, operational plans did not fit the conditions. A primary lesson in these campaigns is that military and strategic planners must comprehend the nature of the conflict in which they are engaging. If they fail to do this, then neither the strategic nor the operational plans will be appropriate to the situation.

Ultimately, success in insurgent warfare is not dependent

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upon the mere killing of insurgent combatants. Both the US and
Great Britain have many historical examples that support this
contention; yet, their conventional efforts were primarily and
sometimes solely directed against the insurgent's military
formations. Neither insurgent force, however, had a well-defined
military unit structure. They were not as susceptible to
destruction in the field or demoralization at the command level
as conventional opponents. Both insurgent forces maintained a
set of tactics and operational principles dependent upon small
unit actions. They focused these efforts toward eroding
confidence in the efficiency and fairness of the government in
power. Therefore, destruction, annihilation and demoralization
were almost irrelevant to eroding the insurgent base of support
within the civilian population.[92]

Both the US and British Armies accumulated many insurgent
casualties and neither solved the problem of insurgency. These
two world powers failed to analyze properly the nature of their
conflicts. This led to their inability to isolate the most
critical element of their environments, the population, from the
influences of the insurgent political and military programs.

Know the Role of Conventional Military Forces

The greatest consideration before employing conventional
military forces in any future insurgent conflict is to determine
its role. Operational planners must assess the threat and its
objectives and the government and its objectives. Then, they
must estimate how each affects the other, and how each affects
the local populace. Only after this type of analysis can

planners determine the appropriate role of conventional military force. Furthermore, planners must consider the function of other national agencies and integrate military actions to ensure a coordinated national effort.

Closely related to the issue of integrating tactics and operations is the matter of linking military actions to social and economic efforts. Integration of military capabilities with other national agencies drives military decisions at every level in insurgencies. Planners must understand the objectives of all non-military measures, and the impact that military operations have on them. Then they must adopt courses of action that legally support these objectives. In the two insurgencies studied, the insurgent carefully considered how its military operations related to its political programs. Furthermore, the North Vietnamese and the PIRA balanced them effectively in a "two pronged" assault that led to their strategic aims. The government, their allies, and the associated military commanders did not. Contrasting the different approaches reinforces the relevance of discerning the role that military forces play within the overall strategic concept.

Conventional Military Operations Alone Cannot Defeat Insurgency

The counterinsurgent's task is to establish order while waging war against the insurgents.[93] Operations therefore must couch these two aims in the overall strategic objective.[94] The first aim is to gain popular support for the government by addressing the population's grievances. The second aim is to undermine the insurgent's attempt to gain popular support. Only

a counterinsurgency plan that integrates all available elements of national power will have any hope of achieving success in these two areas.

To restore the law and order necessary in insurgency, operations must use both non-military and military measures to solidify popular support. Non-military measures must be fair and responsive to the nation's needs. This is essential to restoring or maintaining the government's legitimacy. Military efforts must reinforce these non military measures. The military can be a show of force to keep the peace. Or, it can be a reaction force used to suppress any disturbances or to strike at known guerilla bases. The proper authorities must closely coordinate these actions.

The intent of social programs is to reinforce or restore the legitimacy of the government, not to harass the population. The intent of tactical operations is to defeat the insurgent, not to punish the people. Neither the US nor the British army adequately executed this in their respective campaign. In both conflicts, the conventional armies failed to coordinate civil-military operations focusing instead on conventional military actions. Furthermore, these actions did not consider the effects on the political, economic and social programs.

In waging war against the insurgent, conventional forces must also sustain popular support. To accomplish this, a conventional force must constrain its lethality. Aggressive employment is acceptable if restrictive measures are in place. However, these measures must reinforce the civil-military programs while reducing civilian casualties.[95] Operational tasks

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for these striking forces should include defeating the guerilla militarily and breaking the connection with the civilian populace. A primary consideration during execution, however, should be to reduce collateral damage.

In Vietnam, social programs did not make the local governments relevant to the populace. The British Army, on the other hand, entirely replaced the local government. This caused the people to question the British Army's purpose and the Irish government's motives. In both Vietnam and Northern Ireland, the conventional armies used striking forces. Their prosecution of big-unit tactics and an over reliance on indiscriminate firepower, however, aggravated society. Therefore, both governments and their militaries lost legitimacy.

Insurgency Model is Valid

A final lesson from the study of these two campaigns is that planners can view insurgency in terms of Clausewitz's "paradoxical trinity." Because the US and British Armies did not appreciate the nature of their conflicts, nor the role that military forces should play, they did not sufficiently direct their efforts toward the population.

The destruction of the guerilla is rarely, if ever the primary goal in counterinsurgency.[96] The primary mission is to establish and maintain law and order by supporting the civil government. If there is no effective government, then planners must integrate other national and international agencies. Establishing programs with civil authorities can also enhance the legitimacy and competence of the government in the eyes of the

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population.[97] Certain types of units such as Military Police, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations must carry out critical functions in these programs; but, in manpower-intensive situations such as counterinsurgency, there is no alternative to using combat arms units for the bulk of the force.

When employing combat units to support the operational objective, tactical methods should not be massive, indirect fires in the harassment role. Methods should take advantage of small-unit actions that can mass effects of technologically advanced, precision-based firepower. There is less of a tendency to aggravate the population in this method. Secondly, by keeping the population pacified, it simplifies the process of isolating the guerilla and preventing its mingling with the populace.

This insurgency model in terms of Clausewitz's trinity can help operational planners in assessing the nature of the conflict. It can also help determine the role of the military. Furthermore, the insurgency model will help planners design operations that complement other agency efforts. This is critical to the integration of non-military with military elements in a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan. The greatest, most decisive act of judgment for the operational planner in any situation is to understand correctly the nature of the conflict in which his organization engages. Clausewitz warns that you cannot "take it for something, or wish to make it something, which by the nature of its relations it is impossible for it to be."[98]

V. CONCLUSION

Today's global environment and current National Security Strategy seems to signify greater intervention of the Army and other military services into world crisis. Third World problems of over population, weak economies, and fragile political systems are prevalent. These problems plus the destabilizing forces of nationalism, tribalism, religious hostilities and ethnic hatred now head the nation's expanding list of concerns.[99] The result has been a New World Order full of violent conflict.

This hostile strategic environment, potential worldwide commitment of Army forces, and the US tradition of employing conventional military force into unconventional operations indicates a greater possibility of US Army involvement in insurgencies. There are many areas around the globe where unconventional force or insurgency threatens US vital interests. Our ability to analyze the situation and properly attack this threat in a coherent, integrative manner can make the difference in achieving victory in the future.

Countering insurgencies and the typically associated guerrilla warfare is complex. Success starts with a detailed appreciation of the nature of the conflict. This may include learning customs and values of foreign societies. It can potentially entail learning the goals and methods of many competing insurgent organizations vying for control of the same nation, state, or region, or possibly for different objectives. Embedded in understanding the nature of the conflict is the requirement to discern the role of military forces.

Future US efforts will most likely include various US

agencies working together.[100] Knowing how these other agencies function will help military planners coordinate military operations with them. More important, it will enable operational planners to employ all available elements of national power in concert to achieve synergistic effect. This paper offers Clausewitz's "paradoxical trinity" as a powerful useful tool to analyze insurgencies.

Accurate assessments are essential considering the recent reduction in US military force and the increased US global commitment. Planners must design operations that maximize the potential of the military force while complementing other agency efforts. This Clausewitzian-based model provides a valid method for assessing the nature of insurgency conflicts. Furthermore, it can help planners develop operational objectives that support strategic goals. Properly applied military force, proportional to strategic objectives, is essential to the effective design of counterinsurgency operations.

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